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Abstract 
The accuracy of a tax return is usually interpreted as an outcome of the tax evasion decision 
by an individual. However, in non-democratic regimes with predatory blackmail tax systems 
it is possible that large sums voluntarily reported by influential politicians or businessmen 
may be used as political statements. By openly acknowledging one’s personal income an in-
dividual can signal the strength of one’s position, or, on the contrary, the submissiveness to 
the political leadership. In this paper we explore the idea of the tax return as a political state-
ment and test it using a unique dataset of the tax returns filed by the Russian regional gover-
nors and the members of their families for the year 2009. Our results conjecture that Russian 
governors may deliberately file their tax return as a political statement to signal their strength 
vis-à-vis the central government. 
This article was published in Frankfurt am Main. 
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1.  Introduction 
The  information  transmission  between  different  levels  of  a  political  system  in  a  non-
democracy is usually extremely difficult. First, the absence of open media forces politicians to 
use other channels for communication.
1 Second, an even more difficult task for lower-tier 
politicians is to ensure the credibility of their claims vis-à-vis higher-tier politicians. In a de-
mocratic  society  one  of  the  main  mechanisms  ensuring  credibility  are  the  audience  costs 
(Fearon 1994, 1997), referring to the fact that voters react to statements made by political ac-
tors (see also Alesina 1988). This reaction ensures to a certain extent credibility vis-à-vis the 
electorate, but also vis-à-vis higher tier politicians. Voters observe (through free press) the 
communication between political actors of different levels and have incentives to punish those 
of them who deviate from their original promises, thereby affecting policy choice and ulti-
mately the well-being of voters. In non-democratic societies voters are powerless and this 
mechanism does not work.  
Thus, in order to send a credible signal to higher-level politicians (e.g. president), lower-level 
members of the elite (e.g. regional governors, ministers or owners of large companies) have to 
use other tools. Such signals should be (1) costly enough for lower-tier politicians to ensure 
the credibility of their statements, and (2) available even in an environment of censorship of 
direct public statements. This paper examines one of the existing signals in non-democracies, 
which however, has the additional property of affecting the level of tax evasion and avoidance 
of politicians and tax revenue of the government.
2 We intend to show that in non-democracies 
with high level of tax avoidance and evasion politicians can credibly signal their relative 
strength in relation to the higher-level government by reporting their personal income hon-
estly and thus being more tax compliant. 
The claim that tax evasion and political preferences are interrelated is not new. A growing 
literature argues that the tax evasion or avoidance decision is not just an outcome of a rational 
choice based on costs and benefits of underreporting one’s revenue. Instead, taxpayers see 
themselves in an exchange with the public administration. They pay taxes and receive some 
services in return. People may wonder if the gains from this exchange are worth more or less 
than what they pay in taxes, and thereby develop some attitude toward the equitableness of 
the tax system (Cowell 1992; Falkinger 1995). If taxpayers perceive the exchange as highly 
unbalanced and unfair, they may choose to non-comply with their duties. Obviously, this per-
ception is related to the assessment of the “correctness” of the governmental policy and poli-
tics, i.e. to the political stance of the taxpayer. Even if the taxpayer does not receive full 
equivalent of her contribution in form of public goods, but perceives the political process as 
fair and legitimate, it improves tax compliance (Feld and Frey 2007). In this case, general 
political preferences, on the one hand (e.g. pro-democratic attitudes or patriotism), and the 
dissatisfaction with the policy of a particular government, on the other, may turn out to cru-
cially influence the tax morale. From this point of view, in any country (and particularly in a 
                                                 
1 In the extreme case, the information passes only through the bureaucratic hierarchy, which is notorious for 
having strong incentives to misrepresent signals (e.g. report only “good news” to the superiors, see Prendergast 
1993). 
2 All arguments of this paper work for tax avoidance as well. In fact, in the empirical case we study, we do not 
distinguish between illegal tax evasion and semi-legal and legal manipulation of taxes (tax avoidance). Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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non-democracy with low governmental accountability), by filing a tax return, an individual 
signals to the government her approval of public policy and her loyalty to the existing regime.  
However, our paper adds an additional channel of how tax evasion can be influenced by po-
litical considerations. The subsequent logic is based on an important (and highly realistic) 
assumption. While in a developed society hiding one’s income from a tax authority puts a 
taxpayer at risk, in a developing dictatorship the risk may be higher if one openly acknowl-
edges the control of assets and income. It not only “attracts the eyes” of public officials (who 
are mostly predatory – so, the government just extracts revenue from the population whenever 
possible), but also gives them the option for manipulating legal procedures against taxpayers. 
Therefore, the more information one provides, the more risky the situation is. In this system 
operating in full accordance to the law is simply impossible (because it is contradictory in 
itself,  so  the  “catch-22”  problem  is  unavoidable).
3  By  being  more  open  the  taxpayer  just 
makes the investigation into violations easier: compare, for instance, a “pure” shadow busi-
ness operating without any receipts or documentation and a “semi-legal” business hiding the 
violations in the actual documentation. Furthermore, in an environment of wide-spread tax 
violation the government is unable to find all instances of tax evasion. Therefore, by reporting 
income truthfully one just simplifies tax officials’ job. This aspect becomes particularly rele-
vant when considering that the intensity and thoroughness of investigations in such systems is 
politically motivated. Or stated otherwise, the application of tax law is “selective” by design. 
As a matter of fact, these tax systems are claimed to be deliberately structured by the govern-
ment in order to blackmail potential opposition (Radaev 1998; Darden 2008). 
Under these conditions, generally speaking, tax evasion is less costly than compliance with 
the tax law. Therefore being honest can serve as a (costly) signal of one of two possible po-
litical stances. First, a wealthy politician or businessman (with tax returns receiving special 
attention of the political leadership) seems to be likely to honestly report her income only in 
case her political position is strong enough to guarantee that the tax authority will not use the 
revealed  information  against  her.  Then  truthful  reporting  serves  as  a  credible  signal  of 
strength. The story is very close to the Handicap Principle (Zahavi 1975) in biology, which 
claims that an animal in the mating process signals its “quality” by a “handicap”. This animal 
deliberately exposes itself to a predator and by surviving the increased risk it signals its supe-
rior quality (see also Herrmann-Pillath 2007).
4 We will refer to this interpretation of honest 
reporting as the handicap hypothesis. Second, a wealthy politician or businessman could 
deliberately increase the risks of expropriation from the predatory government to show the the 
regime.  In  this  case  low  tax  evasion  is  similar  to  "giving  hostages"  to  the  government.              
                                                 
3 It does not necessarily loyalty to apply to the tax law as such. For income taxation in Russia, our main empiri-
cal example, the law is quite simple. Complexities can be created from ambiguous and voluntaristic application 
of the law (granting huge rights to tax authority), lax implementation of regulation, interdependencies between 
various areas of the regulation (such that providing accurate information on taxation makes investigation of other 
violations of economic regulation more probable) etc. For example, accurate reporting of private income from 
stocks of firms may lead to investigation of the corporate profits of these firms, and the respective regulation in 
Russia is highly sophisticated and unstable (see Chakovskiy and Dyatlikovich 2011 for examples). Overall, the 
more information is available on a politician, the more vulnerable she is. 
4 Handicap theory is, of course, a “twin brother” of the standard economic costly signaling approach.  Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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The politician makes it easier for the regime to punish herself in case of the possible conflicts 
and contradictions. We will refer to this interpretation as loyalty hypothesis.
5  
This paper attempts to empirically inquire into the existence of “political signaling” through 
tax returns in non-democratic countries. For this purpose we will use the Russian case. Spe-
cifically, we will look at a unique dataset of tax returns of the Russian governors. In the late 
2000s the Russian leadership (first under president Vladimir Putin, and later under Putin as 
prime minister and Dmitriy Medvedev as president) was able to create a centralized political 
system (framed as “the vertical of power” in the Russian political slang), effectively establish-
ing control over the media and restricting any public political discourse – especially among 
those occupying any official positions in the country (like members of the parliament, minis-
ters or governors). From 2008 on, the high-ranked officials in Russia are required to make 
their tax returns publicly available;
6  yet the monitoring and the enforcement of reported in-
formation accuracy is claimed to be very weak (as it will be discussed below). From all the 
top bureaucrats and politicians of the Russian Federation we concentrate our attention on the 
regional governors, because this group can also signal their loyalty to the central administra-
tion by ensuring the “correct” outcomes of the regional elections (which are heavily manipu-
lated in Russia). 
We find that in Russia, regional governors who performed poorly in “organizing” a large 
number of votes in favor of the president or his party at the parliamentary and presidential 
elections are among the “best performers” in terms of the revenue reported in their declara-
tions. This result is evident even if we control for indicators of the actual income of the gov-
ernors. While this result is consistent with both the loyalty and handicap hypotheses, we are 
as well able to disentangle these two possible ways of political signaling by looking at the 
total income reported by the governor and his family (husband and wife) as opposed to the 
mere income of the governor. We conclude that the handicap hypothesis seems to be more 
realistic and that the Russian case suggests that a reduction of tax evasion to signal one’s 
strength is possible. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides further information on the Rus-
sian case and clearly sets up the assumptions for our analysis. The third section presents the 
data and the model. The fourth section reports the main results. The fifth section discusses our 
findings from the point of view of the existing literature. Finally, the last section concludes. 
 
                                                 
5 This inherent ambiguity in the interpretation of the political statement possibly implied in a tax return poses a                                                                         
crucial problem to the sender of the message. To be worth its risks, an individual must expect that the recipient 
of the message, i.e. the central government, gets the signal right. The ability of a central government to grasp the 
meaning of tax returns depends upon its pre-existing knowledge regarding the loyalty and the strength of the 
sender, therefore in both cases reduced tax evasion is likely to be correlated with other signals, probably making 
them more credible (as it is associated with higher risk for the taxpayer).  
6  To be more precise, the information is reported under anti-corruption law, so it is not the actual tax returns 
filed by the Russian governors to the tax authorities, yet the deviations between these two documents in terms of 
the total income reported seem to be unlikely, since, in some sense, they both are directed towards the same 
recipient, which is the federal government (including the federal tax authority). Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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2.  Political message and tax compliance: the Russian case 
Regional governors and federal elections: The Russian political system evolved over the 
2000s from a highly decentralized organization of the late Yeltsin era into a hierarchical “ver-
tical of power” structure. In 2004 the direct elections of the governors were abolished. The 
new system de-jure set the elections of the regional governors by the regional parliaments 
from a list of candidates suggested by the Russian president. However, de-facto, it gave the 
president an almost unrestricted authority to appoint governors. In the first years after the 
elections had been abolished the federal government acted with caution, often keeping the 
strong regional political machines intact. By the late 2000s the federal control over the re-
gional  politics  increased  significantly.  Although  the  ability  of  the  federal  government  to 
monitor the regional policies was still not unambiguous (as late as 2010 in some regions, like 
City of Moscow, the key regional acts contradicted the federal legislation), the center has 
been much more successful in terms of establishing control over the public political discourse 
in Russia. By 2009 almost all governors had either joined the ruling party Edinaya Rossiya 
(United Russia) explicitly supporting president Putin (and later Putin-Medvedev diarchy), or 
established a close relationship with the party leadership. While in the 1990s and the early 
2000s governors actively participated in the public discussion regarding the policy alterna-
tives, the number of public critical statements of governors concerning the policy of the center 
has become insignificant in the late 2000s. The political system is now much less transparent 
and allows only for top-down communication (Petrov 2007). 
However, even a system of appointments does not necessarily guarantee the firm loyalty of 
the governors (see Orttung 2010 for details). First, in many cases the president is forced to 
take the position of the regional elite into account. There is no clear and unique procedure of 
dealing with this issue. In some regions the appointments follow an informal pact between the 
regional elite and the center (like Tatarstan in 2010), in others they result from explicit pres-
sure and conflict between the center and the former governor, leaving the new appointee with 
the difficult task to re-integrate the old political elite of the region into the governance system 
(like Moscow or Bashkortostan in 2010). Moreover, the president of Russia has to consider 
the  ethnic  balance  in  the  region  (like  in  Dagestan).  Second,  while  the  system  of  re-
appointments certainly limits the links between the regional elite and the governors, it is un-
able to destroy them. After some time, governors are likely to become entrenched in the re-
gional political system (as it often happens with centrally appointed officials in large and het-
erogeneous countries). The tenure of Russian governors is usually quite long (at least 8 years), 
allowing sufficient time for entrenchment. Third, the federal administration is not a monolith. 
Multiple conflicting groups compete for influence, resulting in diverse, partitioned loyalty 
from the appointed governors. Fourth, the governors’ personal tracks are very different, as are 
their backgrounds, which inevitably result in divergent political positions. Finally, there is a 
gap between public rhetoric and real actions of the governors, and the center is very often 
reacting to the former (Libman 2010a). To conclude, the system does ensure certain level of 
control over regions, but it is important not to over-estimate it. It is successful in dealing with Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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outright public protests, yet does not ensure absolute and unquestionable loyalty of every 
governor.
7 
One of the key tasks of appointed governors is to ensure the results of the federal elections in 
their regions desired by the federal government. Although in many regions the governors had 
an almost exclusive control over election outcomes in the 1990s, the scope of interventions 
and manipulations in the electoral process and the votes count increased dramatically in the 
second half of the 2000s. The literature on Russian elections illustrates the variety of instru-
ments and techniques for election fraud (Myagkov and Ordeshook 2008; Nureev 2010; Me-
bane and Kalinin 2010). To give only two examples, the votes for Edinaya Rossiya are found 
to be correlated with the electoral participation, implying that at least part of participation 
measures have been falsified. Moreover, the distribution of votes exhibits spikes at round 
numbers which should be observed for any naturally occurring distribution of electoral par-
ticipation. Thus, one can claim that the Russian electoral outcomes are a highly inaccurate, 
unlikely a measure of the political preferences of the population, and should rather be treated 
as the choice variable of the governors and the regional political machines responsible for the 
elections. However, while on average the results of the elections have always been favorable 
to the Putin / Medvedev administration and Edinaya Rossiya, there is still a significant varia-
tion in the outcomes: the State Duma (parliament) elections’ of 2007 share of Edinaya Ros-
siya varied from 48 to 99%, the share of Medvedev at the presidential elections 2008 between 
59 and 92%.
8 As Simpser (2008) shows, politicians manipulating elections have reasons to be 
interested not merely in electoral success, but in overwhelming margins of victory; therefore 
excessive cheating by the regional governors in favor of the federal candidates should be per-
ceived very positively by the federal administration. 
However, manipulating elections is associated with certain costs for the governor and the re-
gional elites: one has to actively use the political machine against possible opposition, to mo-
bilize regional bureaucrats to harass opposition candidates, to falsify the election outcomes 
(and to avoid free-riding from public officials), to control possible independent observers at 
the elections and to pressure the regional media. Therefore it is plausible to claim that gover-
nors more interested in federal support attempt to ensure the best possible election outcome in 
favor of the federal candidate and / or party.
9 Strong governors, on the other hand, are less 
inclined to report exorbitant results at federal elections at any cost. To be more precise, one 
has to control for further possible variables potentially measuring the preferences of the re-
gional population and the strength of the governor – as it will be discussed in the next section 
dealing with the empirical strategy of this paper. 
Tax compliance in Russia: Russian economy is notorious for the high degree of tax evasion. 
Certainly, in the 2000s the improvements in the quality of public bureaucracy, better control 
over courts, as well as increasing transparency of the business sector were able to reduce it as 
                                                 
7 It is not unique for Russia, but rather typical for any large country with centrally appointed governors and lim-
ited monitoring capacity of the central administration. For the theoretical treatment of this problem see Myerson 
(2008). 
8 For the whole set of Russian regions; some of them, as it will be shown in what follows, will be excluded from 
our analysis. 
9 it is not surprising that the Edinaya Rossiya and Putin / Medvedev regularly receive the highest support in the 
ethnic republics of the Northern Caucasus, where the local administrations are extremely weak and lack public 
support in their regions and the local budgets exhibit critical dependence upon federal transfers Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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opposed to the exorbitant levels of the 1990s. This was partly caused by the internationaliza-
tion (Yakovlev 2005) and advancements in tax reform (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2004), 
particularly the flat tax on personal income (see Ivanova et al. 2005 and Gorodnichenko et al. 
2009 for the discussion of this problem). However, tax evasion is still widespread in Russia 
(Mironov 2004). In a study of fiscal sociology of the Russian small and medium enterprises, 
Paneyakh (2008) indicates that this tax evasion often appears as a result of an informal con-
tract with the tax authority. To provide an extreme example: a taxpaying entity files its finan-
cial reports (prepared for the tax authority), which are significantly different from the real 
operations of the firm, and furthermore include a number of small formal mistakes. The tax 
authority investigates and uncovers the formal mistakes, thereby taking credit for “unravel-
ling” a tax law violation and imposing additional fines, yet does not dig deeper and makes the 
further tax evasion by the company go unpunished. Tax reporting prepared by an entrepreneur 
without any mistakes may even be considered by the tax authority as a “challenge” to the sys-
tem  of  existing  informal  payments  and  thus  be  subject  to  more  detailed  investigation 
(Chapkovskiy and Dyatlikovich 2011). In fact, according to the Russian tax authority, more 
than 90% of all tax audits result in “unravelling” some violations of the taw law.  
On the other hand, Russian tax authorities are notorious for asserting unjustified and illegal 
claims to the taxpayers, as it has been recognized even by the high-ranked officials of the 
Russian Ministry of Finance (see e.g. the interview of Ilya Trunin, head of the Department of 
Tax Policy, to polit.ru, 2008, January 17). While the ultimate decision may still be in favour 
of the taxpayer, dealing with tax authority is in this case a costly and difficult procedure. The 
probability of being subject to such unjustified claims increases with the visibility of taxpayer, 
i.e. the amount declared in the tax returns. The consequences can turn out even more disas-
trous for the taxpayer, if the actions of the tax authority are politically motivated. Overall, the 
tax audit in Russia seems to be selective, and is quite often used to fight the political oppo-
nents on the federal, but also regional level (McMann 2006). The idea is, as mentioned be-
fore, that the political leadership is actually interested in the proliferation of tax violations, 
which can be, when needed, used as a tool of blackmail against its opponents. Therefore Rus-
sia has many features of the blackmail state described in the introduction. 
Russia indeed provides anecdotal evidence of behaviour similar to the handicap and loyalty 
hypotheses described above (which apply not merely to taxation, but also to other policies). In 
the early 2000s one of the strongest and most ambitious ‘oligarchs’, Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, 
deliberately transformed his company Yukos into one of the most transparent Russian busi-
nesses, at the same time attempting to take a strong stance vis-à-vis the federal government 
by, for example, active lobbying and direct financial support to a number of parties and mem-
bers of the parliament. In this case the signaled strength was insufficient to overcome the pre-
dator. In mid-2000s Yukos was, as it is well known, destroyed through a tax evasion lawsuit. 
The company’s high level of transparency just made it easier for the tax collectors to compile 
a convincing case again Khodorkovskiy. The Yukos case is not unique.  
There is also a number of high-profile cases when showing one’s revenue may serve as the 
“oath of loyalty”. In 2004 the wealthy oligarch Viktor Vekselberg acquired a collection of 
Fabergé eggs for a sum estimated between 90 and 120 mln USD and transported it to Russia – 
thus not only making it vulnerable to expropriation, but also legally restricting his ability to 
re-sell the eggs outside of the country (Russian law prohibits any export of these items). Al-
most immediately after the start of the Yukos investigation, Vekselberg’s decision was clearly Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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construed as a symbol of loyalty to the Russian leadership. In a similar example, in 2007, the 
owner of one of the largest Russian aluminum companies Oleg Deripaska stated that “if the 
government says we have to give it [our business] up, we will do it. I do not distinguish my-
self from the state. I have no interests different from that of the state” (see RIA Novosti, 2007, 
June  13).  Openly  acknowledging  actual  property  may  serve  a  similar  purpose  (even  to  a 
greater extent: cheap talk is replaced by a commitment, which is – given the state of the Rus-
sian tax administration – credible). 
The role of the governors: The problems of the blackmail state are in many cases even more 
severe for the regional governors than for private businessmen. On the one hand, high-ranked 
bureaucrats face restrictions in their business activity. In addition, considering the Russian 
business practices, if bureaucrats do engage in business endeavours, it is in many cases asso-
ciated with the misuse of their power position and indirect corruption (like providing con-
tracts to the selected firms indirectly owned by the members of the governor’s family). On the 
other hand, many Russian governors in the 1990s had a significant stake in their region’s key 
assets, establishing their own dominant business groups, like in the ethnic republics of Bash-
kortostan  and  Tatarstan,  where  the  governors  Murtaza  Rakhimov  and  Mintimer  Shaimeiv 
controlled the key oil and gas companies, or in the City of Moscow, where the wife of the 
mayor Yuri Luzhkov successfully turned her construction company Inteko into one of the 
most prosperous businesses in Russia and became one of the richest women in Europe (Pere-
gudov et al. 2003). Although in some regions they have been weakened by the “invasion” of 
strong multi-regional corporations in the early 2000s (Orttung 2004), in others they survived 
at least until the end of the tenure of the governors. The investigations associated with these 
informal business groups (or the threat of these investigations) have been actively used in the 
late 2000s to remove the strongest governors from their positions (the cases of Bashkortostan 
or Moscow City show that quite well). Furthermore, since the late 1990s several Russian re-
gions experienced the successful participation of businessmen in elections (Gehlbach et al. 
2010). While the law requires businessmen in case of their success to cease the direct man-
agement of their firms, they of course still receive revenue from owning shares in companies 
(and certainly keep informal connections).  
Based on the previous argumentations, the problem with tax compliance faced by governors is 
clear. On the one hand, openly acknowledging one’s revenue simply makes the investigation 
of violations easier for the tax authorities – and also for the police, looking, for example, at 
irregularities in the procurement policies. In this case, reporting might rather indicate that the 
governor is simply “not afraid” of these threats – for example, given his very strong position 
in the region, which makes removing him from office very costly for the federal government 
(indeed, some entrenched governors stayed in power as long as until 2010, which marked the 
removal of the last independent regional leaders of the Yeltsin era from their positions). On 
the other hand, openly acknowledging one’s revenue may also indicate the loyalty to the gov-
ernment. The tax reforms of the 2000s re-distributed the tax revenue in the Russian Federa-
tion in favour of the federal administration. Modern Russia is a highly centralized fiscal fed-
eration in which the federal government has almost complete authority of tax rates and bases, 
controls the tax collection, and also receives a permanently increasing share of the tax reve-
nue. Thus, both loyalty and handicap hypotheses make sense for the Russian regional gover-
nors. This paper attempts to investigate them in an empirical setting. 
The absence of traditional channels to participate in the political discourse in autocracies like 
Russia  makes  the  existence  of  alternative  and  indirect  institutions  for  signalling  political Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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stance ever more likely. While tax returns represent one possible means to achieve this by 
delivering subtle political messages to the central government, they are undoubtedly a quite 
costly and unorthodox method to do so. After all, one cannot presume with absolute certainty 
that the signal is deciphered and reacted upon. For the sender of a signal of loyalty, a misin-
terpretation by the central government would induce serious wealth losses through the tax 
authority’s standard response of expropriating the complaining party. For someone who uses 
compliance to demonstrate one’s strength, a correct understanding of the message by the gov-
ernment would result in serious consequences, which may indeed deprive that person of the 
possibility to strive against the regime in the future. Therefore, one should also consider other 
probable message carriers at disposal of the regional governors: the votes for the candidate of 
the center at federal elections. Thus a low share of votes for Medvedev or Edinaya Rossiya at 
the federal elections indicates less loyalty of the governor.
10 
This paper will validate the use of tax returns as political signals by correlating the reported 
income with the outcomes of the elections (this signal is, probably, also the most obvious to 
be used by the governors, given the attention to the elections at the central level). Further sig-
nals can include the reaction of the governors on public actions of the opposition in their terri-
tories (suppressive or indifferent – supportive is, as mentioned, impossible); penetration of 
Edinaya Rossiya membership in the regional parliaments and administrations; speed of im-
plementation of federal projects etc. We do not claim that the signals sent are received cor-
rectly; but we assume that if the actions of governors are correlated, and some of them can be 
interpreted as signals, others are likely to be signals as well.  
3.  Model and data 
Our paper is not the first to look at the income data of politicians and bureaucrats. A small, 
but growing literature examines the income of Western politicians and bureaucrats which is 
often published in as part of anti-corruption measures or electoral campaigns (e.g. Rosenson 
2007, Rinke et al. 2009, Kean and Merlo 2010, among others). However, the data is always 
derived from developed countries with established democracy and relatively high tax compli-
ance and therefore assumes that the reported information represents the true income of the 
politician.
11 To our knowledge, no data of this sort for any non-democratic countries have 
been available so far. 
As mentioned above, since 2008 the Russian bureaucrats are required to publish a report on 
their own income and the income of their immediate family including their wives (the reports 
include  a  list  of  key  assets  such  as  real  estate  and  cars).
12                                                                  
The information is published in the year following the year the revenue was generated: for 
                                                 
10 Since tax returns are publicly available, one could question whether governors intend to address other “stake-
holders” with their returns as well – like the regional population or regional elites. However, first, Russia is a 
non-democracy, and the governors are primarily appointed by the central government. Second, as we will show, 
in spite of de-jure public reporting of the returns, population has great problems in accessing them and in many 
cases is not really interested in their information.  
11 Furthermore, in the Western world it is not so easy to make an unambiguous link from total tax revenue to the 
fiscal burden. The Russian flat tax system combined with extremely small number of exceptions and special 
treatments in the tax code makes the mapping from declarations of income to the tax returns unambiguous; if 
anything is manipulated, it is the total income of the politician.  
12 With the exception of  St. Petersburg and Khanty Mansy Autonomous Region all Russian governors are male, 
however the latter is not in our sample. Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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example, in spring 2010 for the year 2009.
13 For the first time it was published in 2009 for 
2008. Although the data is publicly available, there has been very little done in terms of en-
forcing and monitoring the information. Until recently, there were no fines or punishments for 
delays in publishing the data
14 and no requirements as to how this information should be pub-
lished (in many cases it is hidden among many links on the official Internet sites and very 
difficult to find).  Some changes have been introduced in this respect in summer 2010, i.e. 
after the period of study covered by this paper. It is therefore not surprising that the data in the 
tax returns are often been claimed to be highly inaccurate.  
Generally speaking, since corruption and tax evasion in Russia are extremely widespread in 
the public administration, expecting truthful reporting is unlikely. Furthermore, many acquisi-
tions of luxury goods and assets (e.g. houses, cars, yachts, expensive watches etc.) are dubi-
ously high as compared to the income reported. There has been abundant anecdotal evidence 
of spending of Russian governors and high-level politicians substantially exceeding their de-
clared income (see Petrova and Kvasha 2011; Kommersant 2011). In January 2011 president 
Medvedev himself openly pointed out the existence of significant discrepancies between the 
reported and the true income and property of the bureaucrats and the absence of real enforce-
ment tools to ensure truthful reporting (for instance, personal responsibility of bureaucrats for 
providing incorrect information). Therefore he ordered all tax returns to be checked by the 
federal tax authority and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation (Interfax, 2011, 
January 13). The subsequent investigation of the federal tax service did not discover direct tax 
evasion. However, first, the accuracy of these checks (and the integrity of the officials as 
such) are at question given multiple informal interconnections in the Russian political system 
and administrative machine,
15 and second, the checks deal only with explicit tax evasion and 
not with the more elaborate ‘gray zone’ between tax evasion and tax avoidance (e.g. use of 
the offshore zones, see Novosti Valyutnogo Rynka, 2011, February 25). But in March 2011 
the Prosecutor’s Office (with broader authorities) reported about 41,000 violations in the re-
turns of officials of various levels (with only 6,000 violations resulting into any form of pun-
ishment) and throughout many regions (see Vedomosti 2011, March 23).  
For our purpose it is reasonable to look at the declarations exactly to study the tax compliance 
as a conscious choice of an individual. In order to find out whether the tax returns are used to 
convey political statements, it is necessary to link the sum declared in the tax returns to other 
information on the political position of the governors. Therefore, we look at the share of votes 
obtained by president Medvedev in the region at the presidential elections, which took place 
in 2008. Specifically, from both loyalty and handicap hypotheses we expect the governors of 
the regions with lower share of votes for Medvedev to report higher income in 2009. For the 
handicap hypothesis, the idea is that both lower share of votes and higher income reported 
serve as a political message of strength of the regional leader to be delivered to the federal 
government.  
                                                 
13 Russian fiscal year is from January 1 to December 31. 
14 And even decisions to reject publication – although they have been done only by very few public officials, 
though we have almost no cases like this in our sample. 
15 To provide a comparison, in Ukraine, a country close to Russia in terms of inefficiency, corruption and multi-
plicity of informal linkages between bureaucrats and business, but with a more competitive political system 
providing greater incentives for monitoring, a similar check in 2008 discovered that 80% of bureaucrats provided 
incorrect information on their income (see Korrespondent.net, 2009, July 9). Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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For the loyalty hypothesis, one could expect the governors to attempt to compensate for their 
“poor performance” during the elections by being more honest in reporting. Reverse causality 
is unlikely by design of the study: the elections took place in 2008, and the decision to report 
taxes in 2010 based on income for 2009 (we will discuss this claim in what follows in greater 
detail).  
Nevertheless, one cannot exclude the omitted variable bias. Both the outcomes of the elec-
tions and the reporting in 2010 can be triggered by a hidden variable we do not observe: the 
true income of the taxpayer. Collecting any accurate data on the true income is highly prob-
lematic (a problem present in most empirical studies in the tax evasion and avoidance litera-
ture), yet we use two proxies to account for this problem. First, the Federal Statistical Agency 
in Russia reports the information on the average salaries of regional bureaucrats for each re-
gion. One can reasonably expect that if the average salaries of bureaucrats are higher, the sal-
ary of the highest-ranked bureaucrat (the governor) is higher as well. Second, we have used 
various media sources to look for reports of the business connections of the governor, and 
added a dummy for governors with business associations (for details see Appendix B). These 
two proxies account for two possible sources of income for the governor: his official salary 
and his business connections. Certainly, both proxies are not entirely accurate representations 
of the governor’s true income (and therefore our solution to the endogeneity problem is im-
perfect), yet given the nature of the problem we investigate they might be the best possible 
alternatives. 
Hence, our econometric strategy is the following. We estimate the determinants of the size of 
tax return reported by the governor, controlling for the governor-specific characteristics (as 
they will be discussed in what follows), proxies for the true revenue and proxy for his politi-
cal preferences (i.e. outcomes of the federal elections in the region in 2008). If one finds a 
negative and significant association between preferences and tax returns (ceteris paribus), one 
can expect the tax return as a political statement hypothesis to be true. Yet we still are unable 
to differentiate between the handicap and the loyalty hypotheses. For this purpose we use an-
other feature of the Russian data. As mentioned, governors are also required to report infor-
mation on the income of their wives. A popular tool of avoiding restrictions for public offi-
cials in terms of controlling businesses and making assets, businesses and income less “visi-
ble” in Russia (as well as elsewhere in the world) has been the de-jure transfer of property to 
friends and family members. For example, the wife of the governor of Primorski krai, origi-
nally an actress, received control of all businesses of her husband once the latter was elected 
governor. So, we calculate the income of the complete household of the governor and regress 
it on the same characteristics, plus a dummy for the business connections of the wife.
16  
We claim that the loyalty and the handicap hypotheses have very different implications for the 
income of the “total” household (and for the income of the wife of the governor). If the loy-
alty hypothesis were true, one should expect the total revenue to be negatively correlated with 
the share of votes for Medvedev, or possibly both the income of the governor and the income 
of his wife to exhibit this correlation. Both the wife and the governor himself generate revenue 
                                                 
16 As a caveat, one should notice that for some households of the governors (e.g. Valeriy Serdyukov in Lenin-
gradskaya region or Murtaza Rakhimov in Bashkortostan) it could be more important to control for the income 
of their (adult) children than of their wives. However, the information on children and other relatives is less 
systematic and more difficult to employ in this study. Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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for the federal budget, and make themselves vulnerable by reporting truthfully if the federal 
government decides to expropriate the business or to take measures against it. But if the han-
dicap hypothesis is true, the revenue of the wife does not matter. Therefore in order to signal 
one’s strength, a governor is likely to consciously refute the use of “re-routing” income to 
other  family  members,  openly  claiming  control  over  his  assets  in  an  unambiguous  way. 
Therefore the income of the wife should be purely stochastic
17 and not correlated with the 
votes for Medvedev.
18 Thus, we conjecture that for the loyalty hypothesis the negative corre-
lation should be present for both governor’s income and total family income (or possibly 
merely for the total family income), while for the handicap hypothesis we expect negative 
correlation to be present for the governor’s income only. 
In this paper we estimate a series of cross-sectional regression explaining the tax reporting of 
2010 by a set of governor-specific and region-specific variables (the description of variables 
and the summary statistics are in Appendix A). Although the data on tax reporting is available 
for all regions (in three regions – Amur, Magadan and Murmansk – the governor was either 
not married, or his wife did not report any information on her income), we exclude a number 
of observations. First, as it is usual in the studies of Russian regional datasets, we exclude 
Chechnya (for which any information is unreliable) and the so-called “autonomous okrugs”, 
i.e. Russian regions with subordinate status being part of other regions (there are only three of 
them), once again, because several region-specific characteristics are not available for these 
territories. This is an issue of data availability, and our decision is standard for the economet-
ric analysis of Russian regional data.  
Second, we also exclude all governors, who have been appointed in 2008 and 2009; obvi-
ously, under these conditions claiming that the elections and the tax return represent the pol-
icy choice of the same governor is impossible.
19 There is also a special case of six governors, 
who have been in power in 2008-2009, but have been removed from their office in early 2010 
(in Krasnoyarsk, Komi, Dagestan, Tatarstan, Volgograd and Evreyskaya Autonomous Ob-
last). These governors were removed before they have published their tax return. For two re-
gions (Dagestan and Tatarstan) the governor resigned from public service and therefore no 
information on their income in 2010 is available. Thus, we had to exclude these regions from 
our analysis. For four regions the governors remained in the public service
20 and therefore had 
to publish their income information. It is not clear, however, whether their decisions followed 
entirely the same logic as that of the governors. We therefore exclude Komi, Volgograd, 
Evreyskaya and Krasnoyarsk in the baseline regressions, but estimate a robustness check in-
cluding these four regions. 
                                                 
17 Or determined by her person-specific characteristics, e.g. her own businesses – note, that there is no need for 
the wife to send any political signals, unless she herself is an active politician – we, however have not found 
similar cases in our sample 
18 Note that in Russia each member of the family is obliged to submit his or her own tax return, and in a flat tax 
environment there is no room for optimization through shifting taxes between husband and wife, so we just add 
up the tax returns of governors and their wives. 
19 We exclude all new appointments of 2008, even if they happened before the elections, because there may be a 
significant share of uncertainty associated with the power transition, which would distort our results 
20 As members of the upper chamber of the Russian parliament – the Council of the Federation – Komi, Volgo-
grad and Evreyskaya, or as vice prime minister and special representative of the president in the Northern Cau-
casus – Krasnoyarsk Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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This omission of the regions due to the re-appointment of the governors is not harmless, be-
cause it may create a self-selection bias. The decision to appoint new governors made by the 
federal government could potentially be conditional on the performance of the old governors 
at the elections. In order to check for the presence of this problem we implement a simple 
mean comparison of votes for Medvedev between the regions where new governors had been 
appointed and the regions where governor stayed in power. We also look at the State Duma 
elections in 2007, which preceded the presidential elections by less than 6 months and in Rus-
sia are usually part of the same electoral campaign. In this case we look at the votes for Edi-
naya Rossiya and exclude all new governors appointed in 2007-2009. Table 1 reports the re-
sults. Actually, we see a somewhat higher share of votes cast in support of the Kremlin candi-
date and party for regions where governors were replaced and not in the regions where the 
governors stayed in power, but the effect is marginal and is statistically insignificant at any 
reasonable level.
21 Thus, the problem we have discussed is unlikely to occur. 
 
Table 1: Voting for Putin and Edinaya Rossiya (%), difference of means between the 
regions where governors have and have not been replaced in the year of elections 
Variable  Same governor  New governor  Difference 
Presidential elections 




















Note: including all regions of Russia with the exception of Chechnya. Excluding autonomous 
okrugs does not change the results 
Since the distribution of the reported income is characterized by significant outliers, we have 
used a concave transformation and taken the logs of the income reported as the dependent 
variable. However, we will explicitly discuss the role of outliers in the following regressions.  
4.  Results 
4.1 Is tax return a political statement? 
Table 2 reports the key findings of the paper for the tax returns filed by the governors them-
selves. In the specifications (1) and (2) we simply regress the size of tax returns on the voting 
for Medvedev in 2008, as well as person-specific characteristics of the governors. Specifi-
cally, we take the year of appointment or election to the gubernatorial position, the age and 
                                                 
21 Furthermore, the standard deviation of electoral outcomes in the regions where new governors were appointed 
is larger than in regions, where the gold governor stayed in power, thus suggesting that both high-performers and 
low-performers were among the regions where the governor lost his position. Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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the age squared (to account for possible non-linearity of the age effect, which could reflect 
differences between cohorts in terms of their revenue and tax evasion behavior), as well as 
dummies for the professional origin of the governors: military, economists (including busi-
ness administration, trade and commerce etc.) and bureaucrats (“civil servants”). The remain-
ing governors are mostly engineers (with very few exceptions of journalists etc.). We find that 
there is a significant and negative association between the revenue reported by the governors 
and the shares of votes for Medvedev in 2008, as one could expect from the “tax return as 
political message” logic. Age has a non-linear and significant effect (which, as further specifi-
cations show, is not robust).  
In the specifications (3)-(6) we account for the problem of the omitted variable bias discussed 
above by controlling for the proxies of true revenue of the governor: dummy business connec-
tions and the average salary of the regional bureaucrat. Indeed we find that in regions where 
average bureaucrats are rich, the governor on average earns more as well. The reverse causal-
ity is highly unlikely: the governor is but one individual, compared with thousands of civil 
servants even in the smallest regions. Furthermore, as noticed, income from the bureaucratic 
appointment is just one of the components of the revenue of the governor. In a further specifi-
cation we substitute this variable by the size of administrative expenditures in the regional 
budget, which may also reflect special benefits to the governor, which also has a significant 
and positive effect. The dummy variable business connection has no effect (possibly because 
business affiliation is often routed through other members of the family).
22 It should be no-
ticed though that our measure of business connections based on media reports is highly in-
complete in the Russian case. The share of votes for Medvedev remains negative and signifi-
cant. 
In addition, the specification (5) looks at the problem of outliers. As mentioned, the log trans-
formation produces a more or less smooth distribution of income reported by the governors, 
but there are still two regions with extraordinary large income reported by the governors: Tver 
and Kaliningrad. In terms of the absolute value, the governors ruling in these territories re-
ported earnings about 10 times higher than the richest governor outside of these two regions. 
In all cases the governors have been wealthy businessmen, so there may be a special effect 
present. However, after excluding these two regions our findings remain robust.  
In the following specifications we investigate the role of region-specific variables in the de-
termining of the tax returns. We use all variables, if possible, from the year 2008, i.e. the year 
of Medvedev elections. In specification (7) we control for the educational background of the 
regional population. The idea is that, although, as noticed, the dependence of the governors in 
Medvedev’s Russia on the public opinion in their regions is very small, it still could matter; 
however, the degree of awareness and of understanding of the issues related to the public tax 
returns (particularly because of the attempts to somewhat “hide” the information described 
above) may depend upon the educational level of the population.
23 We specifically look at the 
                                                 
22 We have also estimated a specification including a business connections dummy for the whole family (when 
either a husband or a wife have business connections). We find no significant impact of this variable on the in-
come of the governor; the negative and significant effect of voting for Medvedev on reported income persists, 
except for regressions (9) and (10), where it is only marginally insignificant (p-value 0.106 and 0.101). 
23 Overall, according to the survey of VCIOM published in May 2009, only 13% of the respondents attempted to 
obtain information from the published declarations of income; 30% do not even know where the declarations 
were published and how one could access them. The share of respondents paying attention to the declarations of 
public officials (excluding president and prime minister) varied for different groups of bureaucrats between 1 Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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share of the regional population with the university degree, given the fact that Russia still is 
able to ensure an almost 100% secondary school enrollment. However, our effects for the 
votes for Medvedev do not change.  
In specification (8) we add the proxies of the federal control over the regional security ser-
vices: police, Prosecutor’s office (responsible for the oversight of other security agencies) and 
the Federal Security Service. All these agencies are officially subordinate to the federal gov-
ernment, yet unofficially in the 1990s the regional administration often were claimed to be 
able to “capture” them, particularly through development of a network of informal connec-
tions with the heads of regional branches of the federal agencies. In the 2000s president Putin 
attempted to change the situation by replacing the old “entrenched” heads by the new ap-
pointees without any links to the region (see Petrov 2005). We use an index reported by Pet-
rov (2009) illustrating the origin of the heads of regional security services in 2007 – which 
varies from 0 (no connection to the region whatsoever) to 4 (born and spent the whole carrier 
in the region). Certainly, there have been changes between 2007 and 2009, yet more recent 
datasets are unavailable. However, inclusion of these variables in the regressions does not 
generate any significant effects; the effect of votes for Medvedev remains negative and sig-
nificant. 
In the next two specifications (9) and (10) we add a set of further region-specific variables, 
which can be related to the preferences of the population and / or degree of autonomy of the 
governor. Specifically, we look at the income per capita in the region, extraction of oil and 
gas, territory and population (which represent the economic potential of the territory), as well 
as distance from Moscow
24 and a dummy for ethnic republics – a sub-group of Russian re-
gions which enjoyed special privileges in the 1990s, but was subsequently set equal to other 
regions in the 2000s (so that in 2008 their special status was mostly negligible; possibly, the 
effects of this transformation in terms of voting behavior have been  documented by Reisinger 
and Moraski 2009). These two variables may reflect the specifics of the regional political sys-
tem, preferences of the population, but also degree of federal control (although the latter is 
less applicable to the late 2000s). We also add the share of federal transfers in the regional 
budget expenditures, which may also reflect the dependence of the region from the federal 
center and influence the support of the federal government by the regional population. Our 
key result, nevertheless, remains intact. 
                                                                                                                                                          
and 4% (see Obshchaya Gazeta, 2009, May 20). Further surveys show that the interest to tax returns remained 
low in 2010-2011 as well.  
24 To avoid the problem of outliers with very large values of territory, population and distance from Moscow, we 
also take logs of these variables. Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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Table 2: Determinants of declared income, 2009; dep. var.: log personal income from all 






















Share of votes for 
Medvedev in 2008  -0.036**  -0.039**  -0.040**  -0.035**  -0.016*  -0.040**  -0.037**  -0.037**  -0.027*  -0.029* 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Age  -0.351*  -0.329*  -0.276*  -0.199  -0.080  -0.218  -0.194  -0.194  -0.219  -0.218 
  (0.180)  (0.179)  (0.154)  (0.157)  (0.104)  (0.141)  (0.149)  (0.167)  (0.166)  (0.166) 
Age squared  0.003**  0.003*  0.002*  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Year of appoint-
ment/ election  0.009  0.016  0.001  -0.006  0.006  -0.002  -0.009  -0.01  -0.008  -0.012 
  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025) 
Military    -0.465                 
    (0.317)                 
Economist    -0.028                 
    (0.565)                 
Bureaucrat    -0.493                 
    (0.343)                 
Business connec-
tions      0.436  0.426  0.016  0.462  0.452  0.429  0.487  0.495 
      (0.329)  (0.327)  (0.172)  (0.334)  (0.336)  (0.345)  (0.343)  (0.352) 
Average salary of 
a bureaucrat        0.000*  0.000***    0.000  0.000  0.000*  0.000* 
        (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Administrative 
expenditures            0.000**         
            (0.000)         
Education              3.300       
              (2.383)       
Police central 
control                -0.080     
                (0.072)     
FSB central con-
trol                0.014     
                (0.103)     
Prosecutor central 
control                -0.002     
                (0.072)     
Log distance from 
Moscow                  -0.291  -0.326 
                  (0.202)  (0.256) 
Log territory                  -0.019  -0.011 
                  (0.174)  (0.185) 
Log population                  0.138  0.189 
                  (0.156)  (0.184) 
Income per capita                  0.000  0.000 
                  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Dummy republic                  0.117  0.106 
                  (0.318)  (0.320) 
Oil and gas                  -0.000*  -0.000* 
                  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Fiscal transfers                    0.497 
                    (1.164) 
Constant  3.298  -10.925  15.740  27.905  -1.780  21.743  33.976  35.714  30.796  37.469 
  (46.519)  (52.546)  (48.423)  (45.135)  (40.189)  (48.210)  (46.581)  (48.821)  (49.475)  (51.509) 
Observations  57  57  57  57  55  57  57  55  57  57 
R
2  0.113  0.180  0.154  0.188  0.217  0.171  0.204  0.196  0.311  0.313 
Outliers  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% 
level, *** significant at 1% level. Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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Table 3: Determinants of declared income, 2009; dep. var.: log personal income from all 






















Share of votes 
for Edinaya 
Rossiya in 2007  -0.039***  -0.041***  -0.044***  -0.040**  -0.018***  -0.044***  -0.040**  -0.040**  -0.009  -0.006 
  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.006)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017) 
Age  -0.633***  -0.585**  -0.494**  -0.450**  -0.145  -0.511**  -0.449**  -0.443*  -0.618**  -0.647** 
  (0.235)  (0.235)  (0.195)  (0.212)  (0.137)  (0.216)  (0.215)  (0.223)  (0.282)  (0.283) 
Age squared  0.005***  0.005**  0.004**  0.004**  0.001  0.004**  0.004**  0.004*  0.005**  0.005** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Year of ap-
pointment/ 
election  0.004  0.013  -0.007  -0.009  -0.007  -0.006  -0.009  -0.009  -0.001  0.012 
  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.027) 
Military    -0.633*                 
    (0.359)                 
Economist    -0.017                 
    (0.638)                 
Bureaucrat    -0.484                 
    (0.309)                 
Business connec-
tions      0.464  0.482  -0.038  0.456  0.482  0.512  0.371  0.330 
      (0.331)  (0.327)  (0.156)  (0.336)  (0.331)  (0.363)  (0.392)  (0.384) 
Average salary 
of a bureaucrat        0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
        (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Administrative 
expenditures            0.000         
            (0.000)         
Education              0.121       
              (2.030)       
Police central 
control                0.003     
                (0.117)     
FSB central 
control                0.059     
                (0.156)     
Prosecutor 
central control                -0.027     
                (0.090)     
Log distance 
from Moscow                  -0.282  -0.211 
                  (0.217)  (0.256) 
Log territory                  0.071  0.052 
                  (0.251)  (0.258) 
Log population                  -0.156  -0.271 
                  (0.188)  (0.187) 
Income per 
capita                  0.000  0.000 
                  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Dummy republic                  -0.471  -0.466 
                  (0.334)  (0.319) 
Oil and gas                  -0.000*  -0.000** 
                  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Fiscal transfers                    -1.218 
                    (1.329) 
Constant  20.104  1.626  38.253  41.670  27.128  36.987  42.013  40.961  28.652  4.605 
  (46.684)  (59.221)  (45.015)  (-44.937)  (40.265)  (47.100)  (46.204)  (49.509)  (43.446)  (52.168) 
Observations  50  50  50  50  47  50  50  46  50  50 
R
2  0.257  0.312  0.287  0.291  0.261  0.288  0.291  0.294  0.408  0.417 
Outliers  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note: see Table 2. 
In addition, we also experiment with adding a set of institutional factors as controls. It is pos-
sible that the tax compliance by the governors is influenced by the institutional specifics of Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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the Russian regions. We use two datasets: the Transparency International corruption index 
calculated for a set of Russian regions in early 2000s (unfortunately, covering only about a 
half of our sample), and various findings of the OPORA (one of the largest Russian business 
associations) survey of SMEs in 2005 covering a variety of institutional features of the re-
gions relevant for SMEs: property rights protection, transaction costs, interventions of re-
gional bureaucrats, quality of the judiciary etc. The results are reported in Appendix C. Given 
the relatively small size of the sample and the fact that these institutional quality measures are 
often correlated, we had to include them one by one and to drop other region-specific con-
trols. Yet the institutional variables are never significant, and our key finding is sustained in 
almost all regressions (in spite of having a very small sample size in some instances). 
In a further modification we look at is the impact of the changes in the Russian electoral sys-
tem. As already discussed, in the 1990s governors were elected, while after 2004 they became 
appointed by the federal center. Different governors therefore had different history in terms of 
elections and appointments. These differences mostly likely contributed to the preference dif-
ferentiation (which makes the governors less homogenous and more likely to agree or dis-
agree with central policies), but could also have an impact on the governor’s tax reporting 
behavior. In Appendix E we explore this opportunity, by adding the following variables: (a) a 
dummy  for  governors,  who  have  never  been  elected  in  the  past;  (b)  the  number  of  re-
appointments the governor successfully passed
25 and (c) the number of re-elections the gover-
nor successfully passed in the past. However, the results of the regressions clearly confirm our 
findings in terms of the correlation between the presidential elections outcomes and the re-
porting behavior of the governors.  
We also find that the governors, who were elected more often in the past and who have longer 
tenures
26, report significantly less (for both themselves and their families – at least in some 
specifications). One possible interpretation could be that the number of elections won and 
tenure capture an additional aspect of the true income.
27 Another explanation is the following: 
in 2008-2009 (especially after Medvedev came to power) the declared objective of the federal 
government has been to remove governors, who stayed in office for a very long time (particu-
larly before the appointment system was instituted). Thus, these governors could perceive 
their position to be threatened by the federal administration and therefore attempt to reduce 
their vulnerability by being less open in the tax reporting
28 - the result does therefore indi-
rectly confirm the basic assumption of this paper that honest reporting increases risk. The re-
sult is not consistent with the loyalty hypothesis though: the latter would suggest that gover-
nors, who are (due to their objective characteristic) more vulnerable, will report more income 
to demonstrate loyalty. In terms of handicap hypothesis, the results are ambiguous. The dura-
tion of tenure could represent both strength (connections to regional elites, popular support) 
but also weakness (lower flexibility, declining public support with the tenure of the politi-
cian). 
                                                 
25 We include only appointments of the 2000s. Some governors were appointed in the early 1990s before general 
elections of the governors were introduced; we disregard this experience.  
26 For this particular variable results are absent in other specifications of this paper. 
27 On the one hand, it influences the ability of the governors to survive in their office in the competitive envi-
ronment, on the other hand, in order to win elections political machines should be created, which could be also 
used to extract rents 
28 The fact that the effect is present for the income of the governor and of his whole family is consistent with this 
claim.  Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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To conclude, we indeed do observe a significant and negative association between the reve-
nue reported by the governor and the shares of votes for Medvedev, even controlling for a 
wide set of further variables (and, specifically, some – although very imprecise – proxies of 
the “true income” of the governor). Specifically, a decrease of Medvedev’s share by 1 percent 
point generates an increase in reported income of 3-4% depending upon the specification. As 
a matter of fact, the share of votes for Medvedev is almost the only variable, which generates 
a significant and robust effect – unlike other person-specific and region-specific covariates, 
which, even if significant in some regressions, are usually not robust to the choice of specifi-
cation.  
We also perform a number of further robustness checks and extension. First, we substitute the 
share of votes for Medvedev in 2008 by the share of votes for Edinaya Rossiya at the State 
Duma elections in 2007, and drop all regions with the change of governor since 2007. As Ta-
ble 3 shows, in almost all specifications we still obtain the same significant and negative ef-
fect (what is also not surprising, since the both share of Edinaya Rossiya in 2007 and share of 
Medvedev in 2008 are highly correlated, with the correlation coefficient of 0.849
29).  The re-
sults also provide additional support against the presence of self-selection effects in the sam-
ple, which could confound our findings. 
Second, we re-estimate all regressions including four regions, where the governors remained 
in public service after their resignation in early 2010: Volgograd, Komi, Evreyskaya Autono-
mous Oblast and Krasnoyarsk. The findings (Appendix D) clearly confirm our main message: 
the negative correlation between the voting for Medvedev and the reported income is present 
in all specifications. This result has somewhat broader implications; it suggests that other 
high-ranked Russian bureaucrats (not just the governors) could behave in the way consistent 
with our ‘tax return as a political statement’ argument. Certainly, the evidence is very limited 
and should not be over-estimated (and cannot be expanded, since for other public officials we 
cannot use elections as yet another measure of political preferences), but at least the main 
results of this paper are unambiguously confirmed. 
Third, we look for a number of special cases: governors reporting income exceeding that of 
the prime-minister Vladimir Putin and president Dmitriy Medvedev (two most powerful indi-
viduals in the Russian federal government). We create a dummy variable equal to 1 for all 
governors earning more than Putin (Medvedev) and re-estimate Table 2 using this dummy as 
the dependent variable and applying logit. The outcomes, however, always provide a negative 
and significant sign of the voting for Medvedev, thus supporting our main claim even for 
these special sub-groups of regional leaders (and a different estimation technique).
30  
4.2 Loyalty or handicap? 
In the next step, our objective is also to disentangle the handicap and the loyalty explanations 
for the tax returns. For this purpose, as mentioned, we take the tax revenue of the whole fam-
ily. We exclude governors without wives, as well as governors, who did not report the tax 
returns of their wives. We control for the business affiliation of the wives (i.e. their direct 
                                                 
29 For the sample including all regions of Russia. 
30 The results are available at request.  Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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business activity, but also the significant ownership of shares), if this information is available 
(in many cases it is even more scarce than for governors themselves; we had to screen differ-
ent media sources in order to generate the dummy).  
It is indeed the case that the female members of the governors’ households are in many cases 
earning a significant fraction of the revenue. The most prominent case is Elena Baturina the 
wife of Yuri Luzhkov the major of the City of Moscow. Her earnings not only exceeded that 
of her husband by several thousand (!) times, but she also earned almost as much as all other 
governors together. The wife of Yuri Luzhkov is a clear outlier, so we estimate all regressions 
with and without City of Moscow, even in spite of the concave transformation. But there are 
also several other governors’ households, where wives earn much more than husbands (in two 
cases – Primorski krai and Rostov – the revenue of the wife exceeds the revenue of the hus-
band by more than 50 times; these regions belong to the richest in terms of the reported total 
income of the family of the governor, although the governor himself reports a relatively small 
income). So, we run a separate regression excluding these two regions, as well as City of 
Moscow, Kaliningrad and Tver, to account for the impact of strong outliers. 
However, for this specification no significant correlation between the shares for Medvedev 
and the size of the income reported is observed (see Table 4). In the only specification where 
the correlation is significant (at 10% level), this effect is entirely driven by the City of Mos-
cow and disappears when this huge outlier is excluded. In many regressions we do find sig-
nificant positive impact of the average salary of the bureaucrat and of the business connection 
of the wife (but not of the husband), once again suggesting that the de-jure transfer of the in-
come and property to the wife is a procedure often employed by the Russian governors. Other 
effects are clearly not robust.  
Furthermore, we have estimated all regressions of Table 4 using the revenue of the wife only 
as the dependent variable. The reason for using this variant is that, clearly, the punishment for 
a wife of a governor from the tax authority or prosecutor’s office is associated with her own 
income, not the “overall income of the family” (Russian tax law does not provide instances of 
taxation of families as single entities). The results are even more pronounced: the share of 
votes received by Medvedev is never significant, regardless of specification. Hence, we can 
conclude that the handicap hypothesis is a more likely explanation for the effects observed 
than the loyalty one. 
The results also support the absence of reverse causality, which we have assumed so far. It is 
obvious that the tax burden relevant for any policy decisions is estimated for the whole fam-
ily, not just for the husband. Hence, if it were the declared income, which determines the in-
terventions of the governors in the regional elections, one would rather see an effect for the 
family income, not for the individual income of the governor. Yet if the income is used for 
political signaling, using just the tax return of the governor himself is reasonable. In what fol-
lows, however, the issue of endogeneity is examined more carefully.  Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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Table 4: Determinants of declared family income, 2009; dep. var.: log total personal in-




















Share of votes for 
Medvedev in 2008  -0.038  -0.033  -0.035  -0.032  -0.018  -0.046*  -0.033  -0.048  -0.038 
  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.012)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.030)  (0.026) 
Age of the gover-
nor  -0.725  -0.124  -0.555  -0.077  0.075  -0.563  -0.096  -0.456  -0.165 
  (0.597)  (0.283)  (0.442)  (0.257)  (0.146)  (0.347)  (0.281)  (0.319)  (0.281) 
Age of the gover-
nor squared  0.007  0.001  0.005  0.001  0.000  0.005  0.001  0.004  0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Year of appoint-
ment/ election  -0.037  -0.016  -0.061  -0.036  0.026  -0.072  -0.038  -0.072  -0.04 
  (0.047)  (0.040)  (0.048)  (0.039)  (0.025)  (0.047)  (0.041)  (0.051)  (0.041) 
Business connec-
tions  -0.145  0.156  -0.499  -0.149  -0.027  -0.325  -0.145  -0.355  -0.035 
  (0.518)  (0.430)  (0.535)  (0.436)  (0.232)  (0.467)  (0.436)  (0.472)  (0.413) 
Business connec-
tions of the wife      1.747***  1.305**  0.245  1.487***  1.296**  1.215**  1.016** 
      (0.596)  (0.521)  (0.247)  (0.527)  (0.518)  (0.500)  (0.462) 
Average salary of 
a bureaucrat   0.000*  0.000  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000  0.000**  0.000  0.000** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Education            14.844*  1.473     
            (8.237)  (4.453)     
Log distance from 
Moscow                -0.566  -0.152 
                (0.360)  (0.371) 
Log territory                0.333  0.218 
                (0.235)  (0.215) 
Log population                0.881**  0.698* 
                (0.407)  (0.367) 
Income per capita                0.000  0.000 
                (0.000)  (0.000) 
Dummy republic                0.333  0.084 
                (0.530)  (0.444) 
Oil and gas                -0.000**  -0.000 
                (0.000)  (0.000) 
Fiscal transfers                5.029**  1.812 
                (2.039)  (1.859) 
Constant  104.762  46.641  145.917  85.135  -45.602  167.547*  89.507  160.650  90.186 
  (99.660)  (82.355)  (102.222)  (81.102)  (50.293)  (98.935)  (85.294)  (106.997)  (83.595) 
City of Moscow  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Outlier  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  56  55  56  55  51  56  55  56  55 
R
2  0.190  0.104  0.386  0.294  0.204  0.476  0.295  0.555  0.380 
Note: see Table 2 
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4.3 Endogeneity and spatial correlation 
Given the importance of the problem of endogeneity, we have also used the two-stage least 
squares estimator to account for these effects. Specifically, we have searched for an instru-
ment, able to predict the electoral outcome in the Russian regions, which does not influence 
the reported and the true income of the governor. The instrument applied in this paper is the 
age of the capital city of the region, as reported by Petrov (2009). The choice of the instru-
ment is based on the following considerations. On the one hand, there are no reasons for ‘old-
er’ cities to be ruled by richer (or more tax compliant) governors than for ‘younger’ cities. 
The only possible channel could be the impact of the regional wealth on the governor’s in-
come, but as it has been shown before, this variable is always insignificant. Besides, the gov-
ernors often extract their revenue from connections, businesses and assets outside their actual 
region and in some cases even abroad. On the other hand, age of the city is likely to be asso-
ciated with the specifics of the regional culture, which in terms has been a significant factor 
influencing the emergence of the regional political systems in Russia in the 1990s.  





























Share of votes for Medvedev 
in 2008  -0.113**  -0.077*  -0.111  -0.079  -0.046  -0.010 
  (0.054)  (0.040)  (0.072)  (0.068)  (0.052)  (0.044) 
Age of the governor  -0.437*  -0.306  -0.783  -0.680  -0.122  -0.000 
  (0.260)  (0.194)  (0.539)  (0.526)  (0.277)  (0.234) 
Age of the governor squared  0.004*  0.003  0.007  0.006  0.001  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Year of appointment/ elec-
tion  -0.015  -0.003  -0.069  -0.056  -0.038  -0.024 
  (0.033)  (0.025)  (0.055)  (0.050)  (0.036)  (0.033) 
Business connections  0.579  0.320  -0.348  -0.554  -0.122  -0.348 
  (0.384)  (0.280)  (0.503)  (0.457)  (0.436)  (0.400) 
Business connections of the 
wife      1.719***  1.570***  1.301***  1.132** 
      (0.553)  (0.542)  (0.481)  (0.477) 
Average salary of a bureau-
crat   0.000  0.000  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant  58.370  28.166  174.041  143.072  90.591  55.417 
  (68.367)  (51.528)  (116.989)  (107.044)  (75.104)  (67.418) 
City of Moscow  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Tver  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Observations  57  56  56  55  55  54 
F-stat first stage  12.71***  12.24***  12.46***  12.36***  12.73***  12.66*** 
Note: see Table 2. Instrument is the age of the capital city of the region, as reported in Petrov 
(2009) 
It is known that in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s Russian regions had remarkably 
different  political  systems,  varying  from  outright  autocracies  to  weak  democracies  (see Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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Gel’man 1999, and Obydenkova 2007). Although in the late 2000s regional political systems 
converged due to the federal interventions, some variation still persisted. This variation (cap-
tured by the age of the capital city variable, which is also clearly exogenous to other factors 
determining the regional development in Russia) is likely to affect the strength of the gover-
nor vis-à-vis the federal center and the regional elites and the population and therefore his 
decision to intervene (and the scope of intervention) in the federal elections held in his region 
(for example, the costs of intervention in more pluralistic regions could be prohibitive). Even 
though governors are appointed, they still have to actively interact with the regional politi-
cians and bureaucrats and thus are unavoidably influenced by the “regional political specif-
ics”.  
Table 5 reports the results of the estimations. Our instrument has excellent statistical proper-
ties with the first-stage F-statistics well above 10. As expected, we find a highly significant 
and negative effect for the income of the governor and insignificant effect for the total family 
income. The only statistical problem we encounter is that once included in the second stage 
regression, age of the city (somewhat counter-intuitively) is also significant. However, this 
effect is driven just by one region: Tver (one of the oldest Russian cities (pre-dating Mos-
cow), which, as mentioned, is currently administered by one of the richest governors, which 
we have treated as an outlier before). The fit of the appointment of this extremely rich gover-
nor and the age of the city is likely to be a coincidence; excluding Tver, the significant impact 
of the age of the city in the second stage unambiguously disappears, and all other properties 
of the instrument (and findings) remain the same. Thus, it is possible to conclude that our in-
strumentation strategy provides at least some limited evidence that our results are not driven 
by endogeneity (although we have to acknowledge the possible limitations of our instruments, 
which are typical for the majority of empirical papers). 
Yet another problem we have to examine is the presence of the spatial correlation in the tax 
returns of Russian governors. It can be objective (suggesting that the federal government has 
somewhat similar patterns of appointment for geographically proximate regions – some evi-
dence in favor of this claim is observed in the Northern Caucasus, which is however currently 
a very special region for the federal policy due to the continuing instability and military and 
terrorist attacks) or subjective (this scenario is even more interesting, since it suggests that 
governors’ signals are correlated – thus, there may be some form of ‘collective signaling’ and 
cooperation among regional leaders present in Russia). Therefore we estimate spatial regres-
sions (using both spatial lag and spatial error variants). We use two spatial weighting matri-
ces: the simple border matrix (which assigns 1 to each pair of regions sharing common bor-
ders and 0 otherwise; we had to exclude from this estimation Kaliningrad – the Russian ex-
clave in the Western Europe without internal borders – and Primorski krai – which has bor-
ders only to Khabarovski krai, which we had to exclude due to the governor change) and the 
matrix with inverse railroad travel distances between capital cities of the regions.
31 The results 
reported in Table 6 first unambiguously confirm our main claim and second do not show any 
evidence of spatial correlation of the reported income of the governors.  
 
                                                 
31 The matrix is provided by Abramov (2008). Railroad is the most common way of transportation for people and 
goods in Russia; for regions without railroad connections (mostly in the Northern part of the country) the trans-
portation by other means is taken into account. Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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Table 6: Joint signaling hypothesis, spatial regressions, 2009, dep.var.: log personal in-










Share of votes for Medvedev in 2008  -0.034**  -0.035**  -0.030**  -0.035** 
  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
Age of the governor  -0.194  -0.211  -0.199  -0.280 
  (0.161)  (0.189)  (0.136)  (0.183) 
Age of the governor squared  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Year of appointment/ election  -0.006  -0.006  -0.004  0.006 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
Business connections  0.429  0.420  0.247  0.226 
  (0.310)  (0.314)  (0.280)  (0.250) 
Average salary of a bureaucrat   0.000*  0.000*  0.000**  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
λ    -0.104    0.287 
    (0.627)    (0.216) 
ρ  0.073    -0.158   
  (0.484)    (0.147)   
Constant  26.857  28.011  24.958  5.983 
  (42.72)  (42.311)  (43.803)  (42.502) 
Observations  57  57  55  55 
Wald test ρ = 0  0.023    1.144   
LM test ρ = 0  0.013    0.726   
Wald test λ = 0    0.028    1.760 
LM test λ = 0    0.016    1.057 
Note: see Table 2 
5.  Discussion 
The fact that politicians in non-democratic societies have to use unusual channels to commu-
nicate is probably interesting for itself; however, the range of these signals could probably be 
extended significantly across countries considering the diverging characteristics of each non-
democracy. What is more important is that the channel of communication described in this 
paper has important implications for two streams of literature concentrating on the interaction 
of taxation and politics. In what follows, we will briefly discuss these implications from a 
more general theoretical perspective. 
First, as mentioned, our work is connected with the discussion of the tax evasion as an out-
come of political preferences. The inclusion of variables revealing the political attitude in 
empirical research has  not been systematic so  far  (Lago-Penas  and  Lago-Penas 2010).  In 
many cases, they have been omitted due to the lack of data (see discussion in Alm and Tor-
gler, 2006; Cummings et al., 2009), although there are some exceptions: voting behavior, for Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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example, is included in Prieto et al. (2006). Still, Lago-Penas and Lago-Penas (2010) contend 
that political attitude tends to be statistically significant and positively correlated with tax mo-
rale. Torgler and Schneider (2006) use “trust in state institutions”, “national pride”, and “pro-
democratic attitudes” as indicators for political attitudes in their cross-country investigation of 
tax compliance and find a positive impact on tax compliance. From the theoretical perspec-
tive, in an interesting contribution, Schnellenbach (2006) develops a model where tax evasion 
serves as a mechanism to punish revenue-maximizing governments (the Leviathan) that devi-
ate from the preferred policies of the taxpayer. In an experimental setting, Feld and Tyran 
(2002) and Wahl et al. (2010) show that increased participation of taxpayers in the decision-
making over allocation of tax revenue increases tax compliance; direct democracy also re-
duces tax evasion (see e.g. Feld and Frey, 2005). Gehlbach (2008) extends the problem to 
cases when promises of businesses in terms of tax evasion in the bargaining with politicians 
are unenforceable, and therefore the general taxability of a sector should play a role. 
We contribute to this literature by formulating a distinct mode of how political preferences 
can influence the willingness to pay taxes, which is very different from usually acknowledged 
in the literature. Specifically, the handicap hypothesis of this paper suggests that tax evasion 
can go down not only in case public policies are approved by the voters and organized inter-
ests (taking into account their ability to credibly commit to reduce the tax evasion) but also as 
a manifestation of signalling of relative political strength of the taxpayer to the government. It 
should be noted that our results apply only to a specific subset of taxpayers; we concentrate 
our attention on high-ranked politicians and businessmen with strong political presence.
32 
However, the impact of this factor on the overall tax evasion should not be under-estimated. 
Many developing countries with non-democratic regimes have extremely skewed income dis-
tribution. The behaviour of a small group of wealthy businessmen and politicians may there-
fore account for a lion’s share of the public revenues from taxation (especially if one conjec-
tures that similar logic guides their personal tax returns and the tax evasion behaviour of the 
companies they control
33; in Russia, as of 2005, 302 largest taxpayers accounted for 47% of 
the tax revenue, see Serdyukov 2006
34). 
Second, there is a link between our findings and the academic discourse on the “No Taxation 
without Representation” thesis. The idea of these studies almost directly follows the catch-
phrase of the American Revolution: higher taxation (i.e. perceived tax burden) results in de-
mand for democracy. First propositions in this field were formulated by Joseph Schumpeter 
and Otto Heinze in the early 20th century. They studied the historical background mainly 
from the 13th to 17th century and found consistent evidence that the need for taxes in totali-
tarian nations repeatedly invoked the evolution of early forms of representative government 
(see for instance Schumpeter 1918). Ample evidence for the case of “taxation produces repre-
sentation” has been provided for a range of countries, including Kuwait and Qatar (Crystal 
1990),  Iran  (Shambayati  1994),  Congo  (Clark  1997),  Gabon  (Yates  1996)  and  Indonesia 
(Törnquist 1990), Nigeria (Berger 2009) as well as for international samples (Ross 2004; 
                                                 
32 Furthermore, the Russian governors are quite unlike the standard taxpayers assumed in the literature because-
tax returns are public (it could make “political signalling” more attractive). However, in a non-democratic sys-
tem the key “recipient” of any messages in the political dialogue is the central government and not the general 
public (even if the information is supposedly reported to the population), so one could expect wealthy business-
men and politicians to take this issue into account regardless of public access to the data. 
33 Strictly speaking, the latter statement has not been shown in this paper but seems to be reasonable conjecture. 
34 As a caveat, one should mention that this number also includes state-owned companies; however, there is 
substantial evidence of tax evasion of this group of businesses as well. Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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Herb 2005; Baskaran and Bigsten 2010). Our key contribution to this discussion is to make 
tax burden endogenous to political preferences. Since the handicap signalling reduces tax eva-
sion from influential governors, it increases their tax burden and is likely to change their atti-
tude towards the existing state (in line with ‘No Taxation without Representation’ argument). 
Of course, strength of the governor does not necessarily correlate with the preference for de-
mocracy; but if one looks at the historical path of the evolution of democracy as an outcome 
of negotiations in the ‘king-and-council’ systems (Congleton 2001), some conjectures  are 
possible.  
Strong governors are more likely to prefer the ‘council’ side of this system (potentially asso-
ciated rather with larger selectorate, but not with the democracy); but it is the strengthening of 
the ‘council’, which (often unexpectedly for the politicians themselves) could open the road to 
the increasing level of democracy in the long run (see e.g. Congleton 2007). 
6.  Conclusion  
This paper hypothesizes that the relation between tax compliance and political preferences of 
the taxpayers can actually be more complex than is usually assumed in the literature. Specifi-
cally, in non-democratic “blackmail states” wealthy politicians and bureaucrats may become 
unsuspectedly honest in their tax reporting to deliver a political message to the government – 
showing their reassurance in the strength of their position against potential blackmail from the 
government. It is generally the case that being honest in tax reporting creates larger risks for 
taxpayers in developing countries than cheating, since it just makes the investigation for tax 
authorities simpler and most likely results in increased expropriation. Therefore highly tax-
compliant behavior may send a specific political message to the central government. We have 
tested this conjecture using Russian data of the tax returns of the regional governors for the 
fiscal year 2009, and indeed found out that political preferences and tax reporting of the gov-
ernors are correlated: in regions where governors had to answer for relatively low election 
outcomes for the Kremlin candidates and parties at the federal elections, the respective gover-
nors in turn also reported larger revenue in their tax returns. 
The study acknowledges its limitations. First and foremost, our ability to control for the real 
income of the governors is limited, and thus we cannot completely exclude the omitted vari-
able problem in our results. However, we have attempted to resolve this using a variety of 
measures, and, as one should recognize, in tax evasion studies it is hardly ever possible to 
gather the entirely accurate information on the true tax revenue. We have also employed a 
TSLS approach to solve the problem of endogeneity but accept that our instruments are not 
uncontestable.  
Second, the Russian case may be somewhat specific, given that the governors make their tax 
returns publicly available. Nevertheless, we believe that the very setup where “cheating is 
safe” and “being honest is sending a political message” may be observed in many developing 
countries with non-democratic governments that, for one thing, restrict political communica-
tion, and, for another thing, misuse tax law to fight their political opponents. This holds in 
particular for the countries which at the same time exhibit notoriously high tax evasion – as it 
is very often the case. In fact, using tax evasion accusations against political enemies in non-
democracies has been widespread practice in, for example, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (see Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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Libman 2010), but also in Singapore (Golosov 2011); blackmail state practices have been 
reported in Ukraine before the “Orange revolution” (Darden 2008) and Peru (McMillan and 
Zoido 2004). Therefore the applicability and validity of our findings extends beyond the spe-
cial Russian case. 
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Appendix A: Summary statistics and description of variables 
 
Table A1: Definition and sources of variables 
Variable  Definition  Period  Source 
Administrative 
expenditures 
Total  administrative  expenditures  of  the  re-
gional administration, RUR mln 
2009  Vedomosti 
Age  2009 minus year of birth of the governor  2009  Various newspapers, websites 
of regional administrations 
Age of the city  Age  of  the  capital  of  the  region  (from  its 
establishment or  the first mentioning in the 
chronicles) 
2007  Petrov 2009 
Age squared  (2009 – year of birth)
2  2009  Own estimation 
Average salary of 
a bureaucrat 
Average salary of a bureaucrat in the region, 
RUR 
2009  Federal Service of Public 
Statistics (Rosstat) = Russian 
Statistical Authority 
Bureaucrat  Dummy:  1  if  the  governor’s  professional 
background is civil servant or bureaucrat, 0 
otherwise 
2009  Various newspapers, websites 
of regional administrations 
Business connec-
tions 
Dummy: 1 if the governor is claimed to have 
personal business connections (not that of his 
wife), 0 otherwise 
2009  Various newspapers and In-
ternet-sources 
Business connec-
tions of the wife 
Dummy: 1 if the wife of the governor (hus-
band of the governor) has reported business 
connections  or  owns  significant  shares  of 
companies, 0 otherwise 





stration in courts 
Index of chances of an SME to win a lawsuit 
against the regional administration in a court, 
based on a survey of SMEs by Opora Rossii, 
high values indicate chances are higher 




Transparency  International  /  INDEM  index, 
measuring the perception of corruption in the 
region, from 0 (very low) to 1 (very high) 
2002  Vainberg and Rybnikova, 
2006 
Democracy  Expert  opinion  evaluation  of  the  level  of 
democracy  in  Russian  regions  based  on  10 
dimensions  of  democracy,  calculated  by  a 
panel of the experts of the Moscow Carnegie 
Center, from 10 (very bad)  to 50 (excellent) 
1991-2001  Moscow Carnegie Center 
Dummy republic  1 if the region has the status of a republic, 0 
otherwise  
NA  Own estimations 
Economist  Dummy:  1  if  the  governor’s  professional 
background  is  economics,  business  admini-
stration, trade and commerce, 0 otherwise 
2009  Various newspapers, websites 
of regional administrations 
Education  Share of population of the region with a uni-
versity degree or incomplete university edu-
cation 
2002  Russian Census 
Fiscal transfers  Fiscal transfers from other budgets over total 
expenditures  of  the  region’s  consolidated 
budget (implementation) 
2008  Federal Treasury 
FSB central con-
trol 
Index  of  connections  between  director  of 
regional FSB office and the region, from 0 to 
3, 0 = no connections, 3 = strong connections 
2007  Petrov, 2009 Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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Variable  Definition  Period  Source 
Harmful or posi-
tive impact of 
regional govern-
ments 
Index of relation of regional administration to 
SMEs  (supportive  or  harmful),  based  on  a 
survey of SMEs by Opora Rossii, high values 
indicate more supportive relation 
2005  Vainberg and Rybnikova, 
2006 
Illegal interven-
tions of public 
officials 
Index  of  illegal  interventions  of  regional 
bureaucrats in the activity of SMEs, based on 
a  survey  of  SMEs  by  Opora  Rossii,  high 
values  indicate  interventions  are  less  wide-
spread 
2005  Vainberg and Rybnikova, 
2006 
Income per capita  Average  monthly  per  capita  income  of  the 
population, ‘000 RUR 
2008  Federal Service of Public 




Rating of regions according to the legal pro-
tection of SMEs, based on a survey of SMEs 
by Opora Rossii, high values indicate better 
protection 




Log distance between the capital of the re-
gion  and  Moscow,  thousands  of  km,  0  for 
Moscow and Moscow oblast, identical for St. 
Petersburg and St. Petersburg oblast 
NA  Federal Service of Public 
Statistics (Rosstat) = Russian 
Statistical Authority 
Log income of 
the family of the 
governor 
Log of the sum of the self-reported income of 
the governor and his wife (her husband) 
2009 (fiscal 
year from Jan 




larly Vedomosti), websites of 
regional administrations, 
Slon.ru 
Log income of 
the governor 
Log of the self-reported income of the gover-
nor from all sources, ‘000 RUR 
2009 (fiscal 
year from Jan 




larly Vedomosti), websites of 
regional administrations, 
Slon.ru 
Log population  Log  of  the  population  of  the  region,  mln. 
people 
2008  Federal Service of Public 
Statistics (Rosstat) = Russian 
Statistical Authority 
Log territory  Log of the territory of the region, mln. sq.km, 
0 for Moscow and St. Petersburg 
NA  Federal Service of Public 
Statistics (Rosstat) = Russian 
Statistical Authority 
Military  Dummy:  1  if  the  governor’s  professional 
background is military, 0 otherwise 
2009  Various newspapers, websites 
of regional administrations 
Number of ap-
pointments 
Number of times an individual has been suc-
cessfully appointed a governor of the region 
after 2004 
2009  Various newspapers, websites 
of regional administrations 
Number of elec-
tions 
Number  of  times  an  individual  has  been 
elected to the governor’s office 
2009  Various newspapers, websites 
of regional administrations 
Oil and gas  Extraction of oil in the region (mln tons) * 
1.4 + Extraction of gas in the region (bln. sq. 
m) * 1.2 
2007  Federal Service of Public 
Statistics (Rosstat) = Russian 
Statistical Authority 
Only appointed  1 if the governor has never been elected, 0 
otherwise 
2009  Various newspapers, websites 
of regional administrations 
Police central 
control 
Index  of  connections  between  director  of 
regional  Ministry  of  Interior  office  and  the 
region, from 0 to 3, 0 = no connections, 3 = 
strong connections 
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Index of presence of privileges for individual 
companies  granted  by  the  regional  govern-
ment, based on a survey of SMEs by Opora 
Rossii, high values indicate more active use 
of company-specific privileges  




Index  of  connections  between  director  of 
regional  Prosecutor’s  Office  office  and  the 
region, from 0 to 3, 0 = no connections, 3 = 
strong connections 
 2007  Petrov, 2009 
Real level of 
corruption 
Transparency  International  /  INDEM  index, 
measuring  the  actual  level  of  corruption  in 
the region, from 0 (very low) to 1 (very high) 
2002  Vainberg and Rybnikova, 
2006 
Security of SMEs  Rating of regions according to the security as 
perceived  by  SMEs,  based  on  a  survey  of 
SMEs by Opora Rossii, high values indicate 
higher security 
2005  Vainberg and Rybnikova, 
2006 
Share of votes for 
Medvedev in 
2008 
Share of votes for Dmintri Medvedev, presi-
dential elections 2008 
2008  Central Electoral Committee, 
IRENA database 
Share of votes for 
Edinaya Rossiya 
in 2007 
Share  of  votes  for  Edinaya  Rossiya,  State 
Duma elections 2007 
2007  Central Electoral Committee, 
IRENA database 
SMEs support by 
regional govern-
ments 
Rating of regions according to the support of 
the SMEs by regional governments, based on 
a  survey  of  SMEs  by  Opora  Rossii,  high 
values indicate higher support 
2005  Vainberg and Rybnikova, 
2006 
Spread of bribery 
for SMEs 
Index of bribery for SMEs, based on a survey 
of SMEs by Opora Rossii, high values indi-
cate more active use of bribes by SMEs 




Rating of regions according to the transaction 
costs as perceived by SMEs, based on a sur-
vey of SMEs by Opora Rossii, high  values 
indicate lower costs 
2005  Vainberg and Rybnikova, 
2006 
Year of appoint-
ment / election 
Year when the governor was first appointed / 
elected head of the regional administration 
NA  Various newspapers, websites 
of regional administrations 
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Table A2: Summary statistics (for the main sample of Table 2) 
Variable  No. obs.  Mean  Std. dev.  Min  Max 
Administrative expenditures  57  2146  3466.803  349  21611 
Age  57  55.281  7.734  41.000  75.000 
Age of the city  57  457.754  297.701  78.000  1148.000 
Age squared  57  3114.719  880.874  1681.000  5625.000 
Average salary of a bureaucrat  57  32078.670  12511.440  16657.000  85656.000 
Bureaucrat  57  0.491  0.504  0.000  1.000 
Business affiliation  57  0.298  0.462  0.000  1.000 
Business affiliation of the wife  57  0.298  0.462  0.000  1.000 
Chances to win against the regional government 
in court  56  34.784  14.267  4.200  82.000 
Corruption perception index  29  0.594  0.219  0.000  1.000 
Dummy republic  57  0.246  0.434  0.000  1.000 
Economist  57  0.193  0.398  0.000  1.000 
Education  57  0.175  0.040  0.123  0.360 
Fiscal transfers  57  0.330  0.177  0.035  0.788 
FSB central control  57  0.333  0.913  0.000  3.000 
Harmful or positive impact of regional govern-
ment  56  118.977  23.783  66.000  172.000 
Illegal actions of bureaucrats  55  52.007  27.612  12.000  144.000 
Income per capita  57  12777.440  4937.884  5651.000  34207.000 
Legal protection of SMEs  56  42.571  23.402  1.000  79.000 
Log distance from Moscow  57  0.204  1.072  -1.790  2.475 
Log income of the governor  57  7.995  0.917  6.667  11.830 
Log population  57  7.189  0.834  5.102  9.258 
Log territory  57  -2.520  1.251  -4.880  1.132 
Log total income of the family of the governor  56  8.559  1.755  6.667  17.248 
Military  57  0.035  0.186  0.000  1.000 
Number of appointments  57  1.158  0.368  1.000  2.000 
Number of elections won  57  1.316  1.152  0.000  3.000 
Oil and gas  57  7442.146  42865.760  0.000  323814.000 
Only appointed  57  0.351  0.481  0.000  1.000 
Police central control  55  0.909  1.351  0.000  3.000 
Privileges to individual companies  56  51.596  18.239  14.000  100.000 
Prosecutor's Office central control  57  1.053  1.420  0.000  3.000 
Real level of corruption  29  0.445  0.317  0.000  1.000 
Security of the SMEs  56  41.500  22.611  2.000  79.000 
SMEs support from the regional government  56  40.000  22.782  2.000  77.000 
Spread of bribary for the SMEs  56  93.675  30.761  38.800  177.300 
Transaction costs of SMEs  56  41.000  22.547  1.000  80.000 
Votes for Edinaya Rossiya  57  63.942  9.238  50.330  96.120 
Votes for Medvedev  57  69.209  7.202  59.260  90.310 
Year of eleciton / appointment  57  2001.228  4.648  1991.000  2007.000 
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Appendix B: “Profession” and “Business Connection”  
We have compiled an extensive data base with biographical data on all Russian governors for 
the period of 2000 until 2010. The bulk of the data has been extracted from the Russian ver-
sion of Wikipedia; governor’s individual websites (for an overview see Governors.ru), sys-
tematic reports on business affiliation of governors and their family members provided by 
Slon.ru and multiple other media sources.   
Profession dummy 
All governors have been subdivided according to their profession. We have defined profes-
sion as the employment a governor commenced after graduation and in which he worked until 
eventually entering politics. We were able to identify five groups of profession: i) military; ii) 
economics, commerce and business; iii) civil servant; and iv) others. The first category in-
cludes governors who previously served in the Russian army and entered politics after their 
professional  retirement.  The  second  category  comprises  businessmen  who  previously  run 
their own companies, or held influential positions in national business groups (e.g. board 
members). The third category includes bureaucrats who filled positions in public administra-
tions  (e.g.  city  administrations,  ministries,  public  authorities).  All  other  professions  are 
grouped in category four (e.g. actors, journalist and scientists).  
Business connection dummy 
This business connection dummy measures whether a governor has a strong affiliation with a 
private or public business group. Among others we have identified close business connections 
in cases where a governor was CEO, president, member of the board of directors, founder, 
shareholder, or executive in a business group. Thus Victor Kress the Governor of Tomsk was 
a former board member of RAO UES, or Mintimer Shaimiev the President of Tatarstan was 
ex officio chairman of Tatneft. The business connection classification is based on the available 
information from our biographical data set, as well as on informal information from trustwor-
thy sources (e.g. for Shaimiev see www.economist.com/node/15407883). Eventually, all gov-
ernors with a business affiliation have been marked with “1”, while the remaining governors 
have been marked with “0”. The business connection dummy can be regarded as an extension 
of the profession category “business” which has been described above. Consequently, all gov-
ernors which have been identified as businessmen are marked as having a business affiliation 
(“1”), with the exception of the cases when business was transferred to the wives  (see below) 
of the governors or cases when the governors seem to have lost any direct links to their for-
mer assets (as in case of the Leningradskaya oblast, where governor Valeriy Serdyukov has 
been deputy CEO of the Vorkutaugol’ in the first half of the 1990s; but currently this com-
pany belongs to the holding group Severstal’ and no links between Serdyukov and the com-
pany seem to be present; the children of Serdyukov seem to be successful businessmen, how-
ever,  their  business  is  not  directly  connected  to  the  previous  business  affiliation  of 
Serdyukov). Beyond that we were able to identify a number of governors with other profes-
sions who also maintained close relationships to business groups. 
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Business connection dummy for the wives of the governors 
The information on the business connections of the wives of the governors was compiled us-
ing similar approach, except much less reliable data. We classified as having business connec-
tions all wives of the governors, who are CEOs of profit-oriented companies (non-for-profit 
organizations are excluded) or hold significant amount of shares of other companies. In some 
cases governors transferred all their business activity to their wives after accepting the office 
(as it supposedly happened in Primorski krai with the governor Sergei Dar’kin). In this case 
we assign the business connection to the wife of the governor, not to the governor himself. In 
the same way, the mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov does not have business connections, 
according to our typology, but his wife does. 
 
Table B1: Summary statistics for the governors included in various regressions of this 
paper 























Number of Governors  57  61  56  54  50 
Profession           
Military  2  2  2  2  2 
Economist / businessman   11  12  11  10  9 
Bureaucrat  28  29  27  27  22 
Business Connection  17  18  17  17  15 
Business Connection wife  17  18  16  14  14 
Age           
Mean  55.281  55.328  54.964  55.000  56.380 
Standard deviation  7.734  7.694  7.422  7.397  7.575 
Min  41  41  41  41  41 
Max  75  75  75  75  75 
Year of first appointment / election           
Mean  2001.228  2001.393  2001.098  2001.481  2000.180 
Standard deviation  4.648  4.519  4.574  4.563  4.222 
Min  1991  1991  1991  1991  1991 
Max  2007  2007  2007  2007  2006 
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Appendix C: The role of institutional characteristics of the regions 
 
Table C1: Determinants of declared income, 2009, controlling for institutional characteristics; dep. var.: log personal income from all 

























































Real level of 
corruption 
Share of votes 
for Medvedev in 
2008  -0.034**  -0.032*  -0.032**  -0.035**  -0.034**  -0.031  -0.032**  -0.034**  -0.037**  -0.045*  -0.051* 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.025) 
Age  -0.229  -0.200  -0.225  -0.253  -0.206  -0.195  -0.260  -0.248  -0.244  -0.503*  -0.478* 
  (0.196)  (0.169)  (0.176)  (0.180)  (0.166)  (0.172)  (0.174)  (0.186)  (0.184)  (0.286)  (0.277) 
Age squared  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.004*  0.004* 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Year of ap-
pointment/ elec-
tion  -0.004  -0.004  -0.006  -0.002  -0.005  -0.002  -0.010  -0.000  -0.007  0.019  0.006 
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.032) 
Business connec-
tions  0.419  0.426  0.456  0.423  0.431  0.408  0.458  0.348  0.466  0.493  0.521 
  (0.312)  (0.332)  (0.347)  (0.327)  (0.336)  (0.340)  (0.331)  (0.304)  (0.350)  (0.369)  (0.391) 
Average salary of 
a bureaucrat  0.000*  0.000*  0.000  0.000  0.000*  0.000*  0.000  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Institutions  0.002  -0.001  0.004  0.006  -0.001  0.002  -0.008  -0.006  0.006  0.640  0.329 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.508)  (0.467) 
Constant  23.503  23.664  27.851  20.531  25.831  18.250  37.530  17.842  30.303  -13.539  13.165 
  (43.820)  (45.770)  (47.479)  (48.216)  (45.350)  (47.219)  (50.555)  (50.663)  (47.641)  (58.466)  (67.817) 
Observations  56  56  56  56  56  56  56  55  56  29  29 
R
2  0.190  0.188  0.195  0.208  0.187  0.192  0.224  0.203  0.194  0.222  0.212 
Note: see Table 2 Tax Return as a Political Statement 
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Appendix D: Impact of former governors 
Table D1: Determinants of declared income, 2009; dep. var.: log personal income from all sources de-
clared by the regional governors and former regional governors, Komi Republic, Volgograd, Krasnoyarsk 




















Share of votes for 
Medvedev in 2008  -0.043***  -0.045***  -0.046***  -0.042**  -0.047***  -0.044***  -0.044**  -0.032*  -0.033* 
  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018) 
Age   -0.451**  -0.404**  -0.346**  -0.278  -0.272*  -0.263  -0.277  -0.264  -0.263 
  (0.198)  (0.191)  (0.171)  (0.177)  (0.157)  (0.167)  (0.185)  (0.183)  (0.186) 
Age squared  0.004**  0.003**  0.003**  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Year of appoint-
ment/ election  0.000  0.007  -0.007  -0.015  -0.012  -0.019  -0.020  -0.019  -0.019 
  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.026) 
Military    -0.408               
    (0.298)               
Economist    0.180               
    (0.560)               
Bureaucrat    -0.427               
    (0.315)               
Business connec-
tions      0.524  0.521  0.550*  0.540  0.537  0.548  0.548 
      (0.324)  (0.322)  (0.327)  (0.328)  (0.345)  (0.341)  (0.346) 
Average salary of a 
bureaucrat        0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
        (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Administrative 
expenditures          0.000**         
          (0.000)         
Education            3.295       
            (2.126)       
Police central con-
trol              -0.006     
              (0.100)     
FSB central control              0.024     
              (0.101)     
Prosecutor central 
control              0.003     
              (0.079)     
Log distance from 
Moscow                -0.243  -0.249 
                (0.190)  (0.235) 
Log territory                0.064  0.065 
                (0.170)  (0.180) 
Log population                0.132  0.139 
                (0.169)  (0.186) 
Income per capita                0.000  0.000 
                (0.000)  (0.000) 
Dummy republic                0.070  0.069 
                (0.310)  (0.312) 
Oil and gas                -0.000**  -0.000** 
                (0.000)  (0.000) 
Fiscal transfers                  0.074 
                  (1.067) 
Constant  23.518  8.989  35.774  48.668  42.220  55.101  57.822  53.854  54.858 
  (50.370)  (55.534)  (50.618)  (48.178)  (50.195)  (49.607)  (52.029)  (51.146)  (52.979) 
Observations  61  61  61  61  61  61  56  61  61 
R
2  0.161  0.229  0.213  0.238  0.232  0.253  0.241  0.329  0.329 
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Appendix E: Appointments and elections 
Table E1: Determinants of declared income, 2009; impact of appointment and election 



























Share of votes for Medvedev 
in 2008  -0.035**  -0.033**  -0.033**  -0.035  -0.033  -0.031 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Age of the governor  -0.160  -0.136  -0.151  -0.529  -0.569  -0.615 
  (0.171)  (0.152)  (0.172)  (0.438)  (0.432)  (0.430) 
Age of the governor squared  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.005  0.005  0.005 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Year of appointment/ elec-
tion  -0.035  -0.136**  -0.139**  -0.082  -0.205*  -0.213* 
  (0.046)  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.081)  (0.117)  (0.121) 
Business connections  0.434  0.432  0.429  -0.489  -0.430  -0.440 
  (0.322)  (0.318)  (0.314)  (0.542)  (0.513)  (0.505) 
Business connections of the 
wife        1.735***  1.540**  1.526** 
        (0.610)  (0.582)  (0.584) 
Average salary of a bureau-
crat   0.000  0.000**  0.000  0.000**  0.000***  0.000** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Only appointed  0.309    -0.163  0.232    -0.571 
  (0.527)    (0.690)  (0.706)    (0.823) 
Number of elections won     -0.506**  -0.574    -0.608  -0.852* 
    (0.239)  (0.362)    (0.381)  (0.483) 
Number of appointments    -0.338  -0.350    0.516  0.472 
    (0.226)  (0.243)    (0.523)  (0.522) 
Constant  84.018  287.546**  292.713**  188.152  434.905*  453.015* 
  (90.045)  (134.037)  (137.516)  (164.420)  (238.866)  (245.075) 
Observations  57  57  57  56  56  56 
R
2  0.198  0.245  0.247  0.388  0.428  0.434 
Notes: See Table 2. Excluding City of Moscow from regressions (E4) – (E6) does not change 
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